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Abstract
Runaway social selection resulting from partner choice may
have shaped aspects of human cooperation and complex so-
ciality that are otherwise hard to account for. Social selection
is the subtype of natural selection that results from the social
behaviors of other individuals. Competition to be chosen as
a social partner can, like competition to be chosen as a mate,
result in runaway selection that shapes extreme traits. Peo-
ple prefer partners who display valuable resources and bestow
them selectively on close partners. The resulting phenotypic
covariance between displays and preferences gives ﬁtness ad-
vantages to both, creating runaway selection that could shape
a whole suite of prosocial traits including altruism, moral ca-
pacities, empathy, and theory of mind. Even though they give
a net ﬁtness beneﬁt, traits at the endpoint of runaway social
selectioncanhavesubstantialdeleteriouseffectsonothertraits
such as viability, ability to accumulate resources, or vulnera-
bility to mental disorders. Social selection forces arising from
self-interested partner choices may be an invisible hand that
shaped capacities for commitment, altruism, and other proso-
cial capacities of the human social brain.
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The discovery of evolutionary explanations for cooperation is
one of the great achievements of late 20th-century biology. As
most readers know, beneﬁts to the group rarely explain ten-
dencies to help others (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976), bene-
ﬁts to kin explain altruism in proportion to the coefﬁcient of
relatedness (Hamilton 1964), and mutual beneﬁts and recipro-
cal exchanges explain much cooperation between nonrelatives
(Trivers 1971). Subsequent theoretical and empirical studies
have blossomed into a body of knowledge that can explain
much social behavior (Wilson 1975; Trivers 1985; Dugatkin
1997; Alcock 2001; Hammerstein 2003).
Controversies continue, however. Some arise from a pro-
fusion of models for cooperation that use inconsistent termi-
nology and tend to emphasize one explanation when several
may apply (Frank 1998; Hirshleifer 1999; Hammerstein 2003;
Lehmann and Keller 2006; Nowak 2006; West et al. 2007).
Other controversies reﬂect impassioned debates about human
nature (Midgley 1994; Wright 1994; Ridley 1997; Segerstr˚ ale
2000; de Waal et al. 2006; Dugatkin 2006). However, some
controversies persist because no explanation seems entirely
satisfactoryfor some phenomena, especially human capacities
for altruism and complex sociality.
While kin selection and variations on reciprocity explain
most human capacities for cooperation, some observations
don’t ﬁt the usual models. In behavioral economics labora-
tory experiments and in everyday life, people tend to be more
altruistic than predicted (Gintis 2000; Fehr and Rockenbach
2004; Brown and Brown 2006; de Waal et al. 2006). They
also tend to punish defectors even when that is costly (Henrich
and Boyd 2001; Boyd et al. 2003). People follow rules and
they are preoccupied with morals and mores, monitoring and
gossiping about even minor deviations (Axelrod 1986; Katz
2000; Krebs 2000; de Waal et al. 2006). Perhaps most interest-
ing of all, close friends take pains to avoid making exchanges
explicit because calling attention to them harms relationships
(Batson 1991; Mills and Clark 1994; Dunbar 1996; Tooby and
Cosmides 1996; Nesse 2001, 2006; Brown and Brown 2006).
Friendships exist, but they remain in want of a satisfactory
evolutionary explanation (Smuts 1985; Silk 2003).
This article argues that well-established models of social
selectionmayexplainhowpartnerchoicecouldshapeextreme
prosocialtraitsinhumans.Itbeginsbyreviewingearlydescrip-
tionsofsocialselection(West-Eberhard1979,1983)andmore
recent formal models that illustratethe value of calculating the
ﬁtnesscomponentsfromsocialselectionseparatelyfromthose
thatarisefromtherestofnaturalselection(Tanaka1996;Frank
1998,2006;Wolfetal.1999).Next,itreviewstherecentrecog-
nition of the power of partner choice (No¨ e and Hammerstein
1994) and connects these insights with recent models of how
covariance of partner phenotypes can lead to runaway social
selection (Tanaka 1996; Breden and Wade 1991). These lines
of work come together with recent work on human altruism
to suggest that the ﬁtness beneﬁts of being chosen as a part-
ner may shape extreme displays of partner value, including
capacities for genuine altruism, that are otherwise difﬁcult to
explain.
Social Selection
Social selection isthe subtype ofnatural selectioninwhich ﬁt-
ness is inﬂuenced by the behavior of other individuals (West-
Eberhard 1979, 1983; Wolf et al. 1999; Frank 2006). Al-
though well established in biology, the term social selection
is slightly problematic because epidemiologists use the same
phrase to describe the entirely different phenomenon of some
social groups having a higher proportion of individuals with
some condition. For instance, the proportion of people with
schizophrenia is higher in inner cities simply because many
cannot afford to live elsewhere. Also potentially confusing is
the idiosyncratic use of social selection as an alternative to
sexual selection (Roughgarden et al. 2006), when in fact it is a
subtype. These potential confusions aside, social selection is
the standard term for ﬁtness changes resulting from the social
behaviors of other individuals.
Sexual selection by female choice is the best-known sub-
type of social selection. Female biases for mating with orna-
mented males select for more elaborate male displays, and the
advantages of having sons with extreme displays (and perhaps
advantagesfromgettinggoodgenes)selectforstrongerprefer-
ences (Grafen 1990; Kokko et al. 2003). The resulting positive
feedback makes displays and preferences more and more ex-
treme until genetic variation is exhausted, or until the ﬁtness
increase from more matings equals the ﬁtness decrease from
lowered competitive ability and earlier mortality (Andersson
1994; Kokko et al. 2006). Sexual selection is social selection
because individual ﬁtness is inﬂuenced by the choices and be-
haviors of other individuals. West-Eberhard made the point
succinctly it in one of the ﬁrst papers on the topic:
Sexual selection refers to the subset of social competition in which
the resource at stake is mates. And social selection is differential
reproductive success (ultimately, differential gene replication) due to
differential success in social competition, whatever the resource at
stake. (1979: 158).
Social selection arising from conspeciﬁc choices and behav-
iors has been described in detail (Crook 1972; West-Eberhard
1975; West-Eberhard 1983; Tanaka 1996; Wolf et al. 1999;
Frank 2006). Suprisingly, however, its full power is only now
being recognized. The perspective of social selection shifts at-
tention away from individual strategies in iterated exchanges,
andtowardthepriorandlargerﬁtnesschallengesofidentifying
the best available partners and doing whatever will get them to
chooseoneasapartner.Informalmodels,thismeanspartition-
ing the force of social selection resulting from the covariance
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of partners’ phenotypes separately from other forces of nat-
ural selection. Following Queller (1992) and Frank (1997),
Wolf et al. (1999) describe social selection by saying “factors
other than one’s own phenotype may affect an individual’s
ﬁtness. . . individual variation in ﬁtness can be attributed to
variation in the value of traits expressed by an individual’s
social partners.” (1999: 255–256).
Building from Lande and Arnold’s model of sexual se-
lection (1983), Wolf. et al. (1999: 256) partition relative
ﬁtness ω into one component from social selection and a
separate component from the rest of natural selection: ω =
α + βNzi + βSz 
j + ε, where βN is the natural selection gradi-
ent, βS is the social selection gradient, zi is the trait in the indi-
vidual and z´ j is a covarying trait in the partner (the prime sign
indicatesthatthetraitisinthepartner,α isﬁtnessuncorrelated
with the traits, and ε is error). They then derive a generalized
phenotypic version of Hamilton’s rule to show that selection
favors an altruistic trait zij whenever Cij 
Pii βS + βN > 0, where
Cij 
is the phenotypic covariance between the trait in the indi-
vidualandthepartner,andPii isthecharacter’svariance.Here,
βN is the selection cost for an altruistic trait (and will therefore
be <0), and βS is the beneﬁt to the partner (which will be
>0), so the altruistic trait will be selected only if its covari-
ance with the associated trait is large compared to the trait’s
variance. The model, very similar to Frank’s (1997, 1998)
and also drawing on Fisher and Price, is based on phenotypes
and does not require covariance of genes within individuals.
Partner choice creates phenotypic covariance that can shape
extreme traits such as displays of one’s value as a partner.
How far will social selection push such traits at the expense of
other components of natural selection? An answer to this im-
portant question requires detailed analysis of social selection
by partner choice.
While all social behavioral tendencies can be interpreted
as products of social selection because they involve choice by
other individuals (Wolf et al. 1999; Frank 2006), the emphasis
here is on forces of selection that arise from choices about
relationship partners and group membership. If potential part-
ners or group members vary in resources and tendencies to
reliably bestow them on close partners, then a preference for
resource-rich, selectively altruistic partners will give a selec-
tiveadvantage.Beingpreferredasapartnergivesﬁtnessadvan-
tages because it gives more possible partners to choose from
(No¨ e and Hammerstein 1994). This will select for displays
of resources and selective altruism that reﬂect an individual’s
potential value as a partner.
The nonrandom association of individuals with extreme
displays and those with strong preferences can result in run-
away social selection increasing both traits to extremes that
decrease other ﬁtness parameters (Breden and Wade 1991;
Tanaka 1996; Wolf et al. 1999). This model differs from
sexual selection because in most cases preferences and dis-
plays will both be present in the same individuals. Also,
beneﬁts to others pay off not only directly, but also because
beneﬁts to partners eventually result in beneﬁts to the self via
interdependence(Rothstein1980;Humphrey1997;Brownand
Brown 2006). At equilibrium, many individuals will be pre-
senting and assessing expensive displays in a competition that
results in partnerships between individuals of similar partner
value.
In sexual selection, runaway occurs only when the covari-
ance of the trait and the display is greater than the viability
decrease from the display. At equilibrium, further increases in
female preference would lower ﬁtness because of decreased
viability of sons (Kokko et al. 2006). However, “even small
changes in female behavior (which cost little) can generate
strong selection when a male’s ﬁtness depends primarily on
his mating success” (Kokko et al. 2006: 59). In selection for
social partners, the cost of choosing partners with extremely
high value has little or no disadvantage comparable to the dis-
advantage experienced by females who choose mates with the
most extreme displays. Displays of partner value will, there-
fore, continue under directional selection until their marginal
beneﬁts impose equal costs to other ﬁtness components, such
as ability to accumulate material resources. Thus, social selec-
tion for partners can, like sexual selection, explain extremely
costly traits.
In a model of social selection that emphasizes signaling
submission and real ﬁghting ability, Tanaka (1996) addresses
the possibility of runaway social selection more directly. As
in the Wolf et al. model, ﬁtness is partitioned into components
from social selection that are distinct from the rest of natu-
ral selection in order to assess where the equilibrium for a
signal lies. That point often is reached, he concludes, by run-
away selection that quickly arrives at the equilibrium where
the marginal beneﬁts of further increasing the signal are bal-
anced by its direct costs. Crespi (2004) has argued that such
positive feedback cycles are much more common in nature
than is usually recognized. Deception and cheating have been
major themes in reciprocity research, and they apply in social
selection models, but their effects are limited by inexpensive
gossip about reputations and by the difﬁculty of faking expen-
sive resource displays (Tanaka 1996).
Social Selection in Nature
If the above models are correct, then examples of nonsexual
social selection should be observed in the natural world. Some
examples of traits shaped by preferences in one species for
displaysinanotherspeciesillustraterunawayselectionwithout
genetic covariation in the same genome. As Darwin noted
(1871), ﬂowers have elaborate and diverse forms because they
compete to satisfy pollinator preferences. Flowers preferred
by pollinators contribute more genes to future generations,
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so ﬂoral displays become increasingly extravagant until the
marginalbeneﬁtsfromattractingmorepollinatorsarematched
by costs to other aspects of ﬁtness, such as investment in
leaves and roots (Armbruster et al. 2005). Beneﬁts can also
come from not being chosen. Staying near the center of a
selﬁshherdisshapedbypredatorpreferences.Stottingprotects
gazellesbecauseitisanhonestsignalofvigorthatdiscourages
predators from useless chases.
Signals between members of the same species are
shaped by the same mechanisms (Grafen 1984; Bradbury and
Vehrencamp1998).Socialcoordinationsignalsareubiquitous.
For instance, a bird on a nest makes distinctive movements to
signal to its partner that it is ready to trade roles. The signal
beneﬁtsbothparties,sothereisnoselectionforanextremesig-
nal. In competitive situations, ampliﬁed signals are common
(Takana 1996). When a wolf bares its throat to signal yielding
in a ﬁght, both parties beneﬁt by avoiding the danger of an
escalated ﬁght; a prominent submission display that creates
real vulnerability pays off by avoiding useless ﬁghting. Status
displays in lieu a ﬁght are likely to be extreme because only
expensive honest signals will inﬂuence the competitor. Note
that such signaling behaviors give beneﬁts only because they
interact with the phenotypes of other individuals who have
been primed by selection to be inﬂuenced.
Some examples, such as males competing for a territory,
blur the boundary between sexual and other social selection.
Othersarisemoreclearlyfromnonsexualsocialselection,such
as the huge brightly colored beaks of both male and female
toucans. They do not result from sexual selection; nonsocial
toucanspecieshavelessexaggeratedandmoresexuallydimor-
phic beaks. They are more likely honest signals of ability to
defend a nesting territory (West-Eberhard 1983). Bright col-
oration in both sexes is also prominent in territorial lizards
and some mammals, especially lemurs. Social selection has
also been proposed as the explanation for bright coloration
of reef ﬁsh. West-Eberhard offers a wealth of examples, and
reasons why species recognition hypotheses are insufﬁcient
(1983). She also notes that Wynne-Edwards (1962) provides
additionalexamples,evenifhewaswrongabouthowselection
shapedthem.Thisisespeciallyimportantbecauseithighlights
the power of social selection to account for phenomena that
might otherwise appear to be products of group selection.
While the sources of female ornamentation remain an active
research focus, a recent review endorses the importance of
social selection:
Almost20yearsago,West-Eberhardarguedthatmonomorphicshowy
plumage was associated with aggressive social displays (over territo-
riesorotherresources)bybothsexes.Herargumentwassupportedby
examples from several taxa including toucans, parrots and humming
birds. West-Eberhard’s suggestions resulted in surprisingly little em-
pirical research in the following years. However, among published
studies, most seem to support her view. (Amundsen 2000: 151)
Domestication
Domestication illustrates how social preferences can shape
profoundly prosocial traits. It requires no conscious breeding,
only preferences that inﬂuence ﬁtness among individuals from
the other species who vary on traits that matter to humans
(Price 1984; Diamond 2002). For instance, wolves with less
fear of humans and lower levels of aggression were able to,
and allowed to, stay closer to ancestral human camps where
the ﬁtness value of food scraps was a domesticating selection
force. In turn, those humans who had tendencies to be altruis-
tic toward dog-progenitors received ﬁtness beneﬁts—initially
warnings of danger, but later, help in the hunt and protection.
This process selected for genes that increase human altruism
toward dogs, and it shaped dogs who behave in ways that
please humans enormously.
Humans also show many characteristics of being
domesticated—lowratesofaggression,increasedcooperation,
eagerness to please others, and even changes in bone structure
similar to those characteristic of domesticated animals (Leach
2003). It seems plausible that humans have been domesticated
by the preferences and choices of other humans. Individuals
who please others get resources and help that increase ﬁtness.
Aggressive or selﬁsh individuals get no such beneﬁts and are
at riskof exclusion fromthe group, with direeffects on ﬁtness.
The result is thoroughly domesticated humans, some of whom
can be enormously pleasing.
This process does not depend on the success of the group.
Instead, individuals constantly make small self-interested so-
cial choices that shape the behaviors of others who learn to
do whatever works. The resulting effects on ﬁtness shape the
species by social selection. This process offers a dramatic ex-
ample of a Baldwin effect, in which learning shapes adaptive
behavior patterns that create new selection forces that rapidly
facilitate better ability to exploit the new niche (Dennett 1995;
Laland et al. 2000; Weber and Depew 2003; West-Eberhard
2003; Ananth 2005). Once the beneﬁts of relationships in-
creased above a crucial threshold, they created a newly com-
plex social environment where individuals with special social
skills got increasing ﬁtness advantages shaped more extreme
cognitive and prosocial traits (Humphrey 1976; Byrne and
Whiten 1988; Alexander 2005).
Herbert Simon, in a 1990 article on “social selection and
successful altruism,” described how selection for “docility”
could give rise to behaviors that beneﬁt others more than the
self. Simon deﬁned docility as, “persons who are adept at
sociallearningwhoacceptwelltheinstructionsocietyprovides
them” (p. 1666). His model is based on the ﬁtness beneﬁts of
general social learning, and the assumption that “limits on
rationality in the face of environmental complexity” result
in individuals behaving altruistically for the good of society
without recognizing the “tax” they are paying. In contrast, the
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modeldeveloped inthisarticleviewsaltruismasaresultofthe
ﬁtness beneﬁts of social selection, not as a result of cognitive
constraints.
Social Selection for Cooperation
Indirect beneﬁts to kin are one powerful force that shapes
conspeciﬁc cooperation. Ability to recognize kin, and prefer-
ences for helping them, give beneﬁts to genes in kin that are
identical by descent to those in the helper (Hamilton 1964;
Dugatkin 1997; Frank 1998; Queller and Strassmann 1998;
West et al. 2002). This process has been described and studied
so extensively that there is no need to repeat the details here.
Onesubtype,“green-beardeffects”hasbeencontroversial,but
it now appears that selection does sometimes shape kinship
cues that facilitate kin altruism (Queller et al. 2003). Pheno-
type variability can also be shaped by social interactions in-
volvedinreproductivecompetitions,atleastinwasps(Tibbetts
2004).
Preferences for helping nonrelatives who will help in re-
turn are also obviously valuable (Trivers 1971). The challenge
is how to get the beneﬁts of trading favors without being ex-
ploited (Krebs and Dawkins 1984; Alexander 1987; Cosmides
1989; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Following Price (Frank
1997) and Queller (1992), Frank (1997, 2006) points out that
such cooperation can be modeled as correlated behaviors, an
information problem equivalent to that of kin selection. In kin
selection, a behavior increases inclusive ﬁtness if its cost to
the self is less than the beneﬁt to the other times the coefﬁcient
of relatedness, r. In correlated behaviors, the cost is the direct
effects of the behavior on the individual’s ﬁtness, the beneﬁt
is the indirect beneﬁt from others (holding constant individ-
ual behavior), and r reﬂects the similarity of others’ behavior,
that is, the information an individual has about beneﬁts others
will likely offer. Both kin selection and correlated behavior
can thus be analyzed by partitioning ﬁtness into direct costs,
indirect beneﬁts, and a scaling factor that reﬂects relatedness
in the former case, and information about other’s anticipated
behavior in the latter (Frank 1997; Wolf et al. 1999).
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma has long been the dom-
inant model for cooperation based on reciprocity (Axelrod
1984; Sigmund 1993; Axelrod 1997). In this model, the maxi-
mumjointbeneﬁtfortwoplayerscomesfromrepeatedcooper-
ation, but an individual can get a greater payoff from defecting
on any move when the other cooperates. Tit-For-Tat (starting
with a cooperative act and then doing what the other person
did on the previous move) is a remarkably robust strategy that
nicely models some human interactions. The tractability of
models based on the prisoner’s dilemma has fostered scores of
valuable studies (Axelrod 1997).
It is less clear, however, that prisoner’s dilemma models
accuratelyreﬂectthekindsoftraitvariationonwhichselection
acted to create capacities for social cognition. In most studies,
anonymous agents are randomly paired, information is only
about prior behavior with one agent or the sum of all agents’
behavior, the same algorithm is used for interactions with all
other players, and only two outcomes are possible, cooperate
or defect. Reputation and punishment have increasingly been
added to such models (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Axelrod
et al. 2004; Henrich et al. 2006). However, few reciprocity
models have all of the ingredients that are important to hu-
man cooperation in close relationships: reputation, communi-
cation,agreements,promises,threats,thirdpartyenforcement,
and especially, opportunities to use extensive information to
choosepartnersfromaselectionofpossibilities(Kitcher1993;
Hammerstein 2001; Nesse 2001; No¨ e 2001). While varia-
tions in tendencies to cooperate or defect in discrete inter-
actions with rapidly shifting partners certainly create selection
forces, they explain only some aspects of some human rela-
tionships (Fehr and Henrich 2003; Barclay and Willer 2007).
Nonetheless, such models have been a boon for the study of
cooperation.
Another difﬁculty is that the kinds of reciprocal exchange
modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma seem to be rare in nature.
Most apparent examples of reciprocity identiﬁed by ﬁeld re-
search now appear to be better explained by kinship or mutual
beneﬁts(Connor1995;Stevensetal.2005).Cooperativehunt-
ing is a prime example. Participants all gain, so defection does
not pay. Impala grooming is a reciprocal exchange, but of the
most minimal kind. Grooming bouts are traded back and forth
in parcels so small that the example blurs the border between
reciprocity and mutualism (Connor 1995), although groom-
ing may be tradable for other resources (Manson et al. 2004).
Another example, previously thought to exemplify recipro-
cal exchange between nonrelatives, is vampire bats sharing
blood with others who did not succeed in that night’s hunt
(Wilkinson 1984). However, it turns out the sharing almost
always is between kin. Coalitions of male baboons were also
thought to demonstrate reciprocity, but on reexamination, the
males do not share mating opportunities to any great extent. A
review by Stevens et al. (2005) assesses the evidence for reci-
procity in nature and concludes that there are few examples,
perhaps, they say, because most animals have severe capacity
constraints for memory and cognition.
Where reciprocal helping does exist, it is usually main-
tainedbysystemsforassessingpotentialpartnersorwithdraw-
ing resources from defectors (Sachs et al. 2004). Parceling, as
in reciprocal grooming, distributes resources in small packets
so defection is not an issue (Connor 1995). Another strategy is
to distribute resources selectively depending on the behavior
of others. For instance, yucca plants abandon ﬂowers with too
many moth larvae. This can be viewed as a punishment that
selectsformothswholimiteggdeposition.However,abandon-
ingtheﬂowerswithtoomanylarvaeisinthedirectself-interest
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of the yucca plant, and this makes it advantageous for moths
to limit the number of eggs laid in any one ﬂower.
Imagescoring(NowakandSigmund1998;Wedekindand
Milinski 2000) and other reputation-based strategies such as
indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987), offer information about
an individual’s reliability as a partner and can lead to mutually
proﬁtable exchanges even in the absence of repeated interac-
tions (Riolo et al. 2001). This is not the place to analyze the
diversity of cooperation models, but it is important to recog-
nize that delayed reciprocal exchange of resources is as rare
in other animals as it is ubiquitous in humans. Furthermore,
human cultures vary substantially in their levels of individual
cooperation, with much of the variance attributable to vari-
ations in the patterns of economic exchange (Henrich et al.
2005), further demonstrating that human cooperation strate-
gies are marshaled to suit the circumstances.
The role of partner choice in facilitating cooperation has
long been recognized (Bull and Rice 1991), but has been em-
phasized only recently (No¨ e and Hammerstein 1994; No¨ e
2001; Sachs et al. 2004). When there is choice, potential
partners must compete in markets that change the dynamics
of cooperation. Between-species partner choice is illustrated
by symbioses in which the slower-evolving organism selects
among individuals in a faster evolving species to get the most
valuable partners, for instance, the plant symbioses with bac-
teria and fungi (Simms and Taylor 2002; Kummel and Salant
2006). Choice of conspeciﬁc partners may be far more power-
ful (Roberts 1998; No¨ e and Hammerstein 1994).
Social Selection for Prosocial Traits in Humans
The possibility that social selection shaped human capacities
for altruism and complex sociality was suggested in West-
Eberhard’s seminal publication on the topic (1979: 228):
It is tempting to speculate that the explosive evolutionary increase in
the proto hominid brain size, which had the appearance of a “run-
away” process, was associated with the advantage of intelligence in
the maneuvering and plasticity associated with social competition in
primates.
The complexity of the social environment is widely recog-
nized as a selection force likely to be important for explain-
ing human social abilities (Humphrey 1976; Alexander and
Borgia 1978; Alexander 1979; Byrne and Whiten 1988). The
full implications for human prosocial traits have yet to be de-
veloped, although one wide-ranging treatment suggests that
social selection may have enormous scope for explaining hu-
man capacities for art and literature, as well as capacities for
intelligence and cooperation (Alexander 2005).
A closely related model for the evolution of human altru-
ism is based on sexual selection. Geoffrey Miller (2000; 2007)
has suggested that sexual selection may account for many ex-
treme human cognitive and behavioral traits that are otherwise
difﬁcult to explain, especially altruism. He cites evidence that
both women and men prefer to marry kind reliable partners,
giving a ﬁtness advantage via sexual selection to individuals
of both sexes with these heritable personality traits. Sexual
selection could thus shape extreme altruism. This potentially
important hypothesis has not been emphasized in recent lit-
erature, perhaps because it is difﬁcult to study. Miller (2000)
acknowledges that other forms of social selection may be im-
portant, but mostly, he says, “because they change the social
scenery behind sexual selection.”
Mate choices create potent selection forces, but so do
choices of relationship partners. The ﬁtness beneﬁts from
choosing social partners are more distant from direct repro-
duction, but they can inﬂuence ﬁtness nearly every day and at
all ages. If partnerships yield a net gain for both parties, then
ﬁtness increases with the increase in the number of others who
want you as a partner, at least for the ﬁrst few partners. If part-
ners vary in value, then ﬁtness will be increased by behaving
in ways that increase the number of others who want you as a
partner (No¨ e and Hammerstein 1994). A good way to increase
the number of available number of partners is to advertise,
and to usually provide, more beneﬁts than others can or will
provide (Roberts 1998; Barclay and Willer 2007; Hardy and
Van Vugt 2006).
Such “competitive altruism” has been the topic of several
descriptions and studies (Roberts 1998; Barclay and Willer
2007; Hardy and Van Vugt 2006). The latter two studies are
especially germane because they model and provide data that
demonstrate competitive altruism in humans. Competitive al-
truism gives an advantage when extreme generosity results in
disproportionate payoffs from pairing with the best partners.
In Barclay and Willer’s study using a prisoner’s-dilemma-like
task, generosity levels increased dramatically when partici-
pants knew their behaviors were observable and could be used
byotherschoosingpartners.Theeffectwasrobusteventhough
the experiment was anonymous. Hardy and Van Vugt also
demonstrated increased altruism when behavior is observed,
and they found that the most altruistic individuals gained the
highest status and were preferred as partners, thus gaining
beneﬁts.
The resulting positive feedback process can shape costly
displays, and preferences for partners who present such dis-
plays.Displaysofresources,talentandotherindicatorsofpart-
ner value are prominent aspects of human cultures (Barkow
1989; Dunbar et al. 1999; Miller 2000; Schaller and Crandall
2003; Alexander 2005). Conspicuous consumption, from pot-
latches to Rolexes, has been interpreted as wasteful status dis-
plays (Veblen 1899), but such displays not only entice mates,
theyalsoadvertiseanindividual’sdesirabilityasarelationship
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partner or a group member. Competitions in such displays re-
ward only the most extreme and remarkable performances and
creations (Veblen 1899; Frank 1999; Alexander 2005).
People advertise their reputations as much as their re-
sources, and displays of moral character are an equally im-
pressive aspect of human cultures (Katz 2000). Reputation
display competitions may be important for explaining human
moral capacities and altruistic behaviors that are not reliably
reciprocated. Recent models suggest that altruism itself may
be an honest advertisement based on the handicap principle
(Gintis et al. 2001; Pilot 2005; Hardy and Van Vugt 2006;
Barclay and Willer 2007).
Strong reciprocity is closely related (Gintis et al. 2001).
AsFehrandHenrichputit(2003:57),“Theessentialfeatureof
strongreciprocityisawillingnesstosacriﬁceresourcesinboth
rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior, even if
this is costly and provides neither present nor future economic
rewards for the reciprocator.” They argue that this apparently
“excess”altruismisnotamistake,butanadaptationthatarises
because even small amounts of conformist transmission give
advantages to cooperate-punish strategies that result in their
spread in cultural groups. The previous argument about the
Baldwin effect and emergent forces of selection in groups is
similar, but focuses more attention on behaviors at the level
of the individual. Prior work on the evolution of capacities
for commitment (Nesse 2001) is also related, although com-
mitment strategies rely more on intensive communication of
threats and promises, and ways to make them believable even
when fulﬁlling the commitment would not be in the actor’s
interests. As noted already, research on cooperation is vulner-
able to confusion because it probably is shaped by multiple
selection pressures that are hard to disentangle.
The assortment that brings cooperators together need not
be based on recognition or identity tags; simple environmen-
tal or partner preferences are sufﬁcient (Pepper and Smuts
2002; Pepper 2007). Any mechanism that associates coop-
erators gives advantages to those with prosocial traits (Wolf
et al. 1999; Frank 2006). The results of such selective asso-
ciation of cooperators can be framed as trait-group selection
(Wilson and Sober 1994), but such models are very different
from old group selection, so to prevent confusion “an alterna-
tive is to state as simply as possible what they are—models
of nonrandom assortment of altruistic genes” (West et al.
2007: 11).
The opportunity to choose from a variety of partners, and
thepossibilityofnegotiatingcontractsandprices,suggestsap-
plying market models to the problem of cooperation (No¨ e and
Hammerstein1995;Hammerstein2001;No¨ eetal.2001).Con-
sumers and producers, whether humans, other animals, plants
or fungi, select among available partners based upon their util-
ity, availability, and price. Replacement of cheaters with more
proﬁtable partners exerts a powerful selection force for trans-
action quality and the ability to conceal and detect defection
(Frank 1988, Trivers 2000). This shapes market efﬁciency and
integrity, even to the apparently maladaptive extreme of guar-
antees that “the customer is always right.” Such guarantees are
exploitable and costly, but competition for customers keeps
them prevalent.
The argument that social selection shapes extreme traits
forwinningcompetitionsforrelationshippartnerscanberead-
ily expanded to encompass parallel processes at the group
level. Individuals in groups assess the qualities of potential
future members and admit those who offer the most while
demanding the least. Conversely, prospective new members
assess which group offers them the most at the least cost. The
result is a sorting of individuals by their abilities to contribute
resources, creating groups readily ranked in quality. However,
because being a big ﬁsh in a small pond can payoff better than
being a small ﬁsh in a big pond, the partner value of members
will overlap between groups (Frank 1985).
Skew theory (Reeve and Shen 2006) may clarify the dy-
namics of individuals competing for resources other than ac-
cess to reproduction in social groups. Individuals in groups
should value new members proportional to their effects on
group members’ ability to get resources. Potential members
display both their resources and their willingness to share
them. After an individual joins a group, the dynamics shift
to those based on the costs and beneﬁts of allowing a member
to stay, and competition for allies and position within a group.
Social selection from competitions to join the best groups may
be more powerful than competition to be chosen as an individ-
ual partner, but the complexities make it wise to focus here on
simpler partnerships.
It is important to note that the behaviors of individu-
als groups can create emergent forces of natural selection in
groups that shape otherwise inexplicable traits such as gen-
uine altruism, group loyalty and boundaries that deﬁne the
in-group and devalue out-groups (Alexander and Borgia 1978;
Boyd and Richerson 1985). Such forces may emerge reliably
from individuals and partnerships pursing their own interests.
While such emergent selection forces would not exist without
the group, they are very different from group selection in that
they do not depend on the success of the group.
Models
Most models partition ﬁtness effects into social selection and
naturalselectioncomponents,anddescribehowcovariancebe-
tween traits in associated partners can account for the strength
ofsocialselection(West-Eberhard1975;West-Eberhard1983;
Tanaka 1996; Wolf et al. 1999; Frank 2006). It is difﬁcult,
however, for such models to describe the dynamic process of
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Figure 1.
Correlation of G with C for ﬁxed partnerships over 50 iterations for six levels of R.
choosing repeatedly among many possible partners as a func-
tion of behaviors that change over time.
An agent-based shared-investment model may help to il-
lustratesomeoftheseprocesses.Asimpleinitialmodelassigns
eachagentarandomlydistributedgenerosityparameter,G,that
ranges from 0.0 to 1.0. Each of 100 agents is endowed with
capital,C = 100.Ineach iteration,pairsofagentsinvest aper-
centageoftheirtotalresources,(G∗C)and(G ∗C )respectively
(theprimemarkindicatesthepartner’sparameters).Bothpart-
nersreceiveapayoffequaltohalfoftheirtotaljointinvestment
times R, the rate of return: Payoff = R∗((G∗C) + (G ∗C ))/2.
If this model is run without sorting, agents remain in ﬁxed
pairs. The agent with a higher G does worse because it invests
more than the partner on each move, but they share the pay-
offs equally. Despite the higher payoffs for the less generous
agent in each pair, when all 100 agents are considered, more
generous agents on average have superior payoffs as reﬂected
in increasing correlations of G with C with each iteration. The
correlation of G with C increases with each iteration. How
fast it becomes positive depends on R. As shown in Figure 1,
when R = 1.03, correlations become positive by iteration 40.
For R = 1.05 the correlation becomes positive at iteration 25,
but reaches only 0.40 at iteration 50. When R = 1.10, the cor-
relation becomes positive at iteration 12 and approaches an
asymptote of 0.60.
Model2isthesameexceptthatateachiterationtheagents
aresortedaccordingtoG × C,thetotalinvestmentmadeonthe
previous move. This increasingly pairs more generous agents
as if each one were watching all others and pairing with the
available partner who offers the best combination of resources
and generosity. More generous agents still accumulate capital
more slowly than their less generous partners, but the sorting
process greatly increases the maximum correlation and how
quickly it becomes positive. As illustrated in Figure 2, G × C
becomes positive at the 9th iteration if R = 1.05, and at the 5th
iteration if R = 1.10. Both continue on to correlations much
higher than in the model without partner choice.
These simple models illustrate how partner choice can
shape increased generosity. The model could easily be elabo-
ratedbyallowingreproductionasafunctionofcapitalaccumu-
lation, or by using a genetic algorithm to see what parameters
are optimal and whether different subtypes of agents ﬁnd evo-
lutionarilystablealternativestrategies.Suchmodelscouldalso
use random normal distributions of R in order to study the in-
ﬂuence of stochastic payoffs. It will be interesting to discover
the optimal levels of generosity across different levels of other
parameters and whether populations of agents go to a stable
equilibrium or if they cycle. Future models also need to incor-
poratethepossibilityofdeception,althoughcontinuingchoice
among known potential partners makes deception less impor-
tant than in most reciprocity models. Social selection models
lend themselves to investigations of how hierarchy inﬂuences
cooperation.
The Invisible Hand
Adam Smith ([1759] 1976) was preoccupied with ﬁnding ex-
planationsforsympathy,andhisfollowersarguethathewould
150 Biological Theory 2(2) 2007Randolph M. Nesse
Correlations of G with C: Partner Choice
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Iteration 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
R=1.05 R=1.10
Figure 2.
Correlation of G with C given partner choice over 50 iterations for two levels of R.
be dissatisﬁed with current evolutionary theories of altruism
(Khalil 2004). In his book on the moral passions, Smith men-
tioned the invisible hand only once, and this was with respect
to the division of resources. The idea of the invisible hand
seems equally germane, however, to the origins of moral emo-
tions. Individuals pursue their interests by trying to attract the
best possible partners. To succeed, they must offer to fulﬁll
the wishes and expectations of potential partners at the lowest
possible price. This usually requires carrying out many expen-
sive actions that help and please others. Self-interested partner
choice may be the invisible hand that shaped human capacities
for sympathy.
Socialexchangewithpartnerchoicegivesrisetoemergent
forces of natural selection that can shape social traits far more
sophisticated than generic sympathy. These forces should give
ﬁtness advantages to those who pay close attention to what
others want, something very much like theory of mind. They
could also shape empathic concern for the welfare of partners
and strong motives to make reparations, not only for actual
defections, but for even hints of possible lack of attention to
the other’s needs (Wu and Axelrod 1995). And, they can shape
love, spite, contempt, and the whole range of social emotions
(Nesse 1990). Most globally, these social market forces shape
desires to please others in general, and desires to avoid any
cause of displeasure. Indeed, powerful internal mechanisms
reward us for helping others (Brown et al. 2003), and cause
guilt and shame when we cause others pain or disappointment
(Gibbard 1990).
Caveats and Conclusions
Severalcaveatsandlimitationsshouldbekeptinmind.First,as
alreadynoted,multiplemechanismsofselectionshapecapaci-
tiesforcooperation.Whilethisarticleemphasizestheeffectsof
runaway social selection resulting from social partner choice,
several other forces are involved, including sexual selection,
the beneﬁts of mutualisms, and plain reciprocity.
Second, and closely related, the ﬁtness beneﬁts of so-
cial selection are intimately involved with reciprocity and kin
selection. In one sense this is not an issue. Other different per-
spectives,suchasreciprocityandkinselection,canbemodeled
in a common framework. The social selection perspective is
distinctive, however, because it shifts the focus of attention
away from decisions to cooperate or defect and abilities to
detect cheating, and toward the quite different tasks of select-
ing carefully among a variety of potential partners, trying to
discernwhattheywant,andtryingtoprovideit,sooneismore
likely to be chosen and kept as a partner.
Reciprocity and social selection models of cooperation
differ not only because they partition ﬁtness effects differ-
ently, but also because social selection gives rise to runaway
processes that can account for traits that decrease survival or
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competitiveness, such as extreme altruism. For the same rea-
son, the beneﬁts of socially selected traits may come at the
cost of increased vulnerability to serious mental disorders. For
instance, rapid selection for complex social capacities may
have pushed some traits close to a ﬁtness “cliff-edge” beyond
which lies catastrophic cognitive failure of the sort seen in
schizophrenia (Nesse 2004).
Social selection calls attention to the locus of selection’s
action: heritable variations in social traits that inﬂuence abil-
ities to get and maintain relationships with preferred social
partners. Empathy, self-esteem, guilt, anger, and tendencies to
displaymoral traitsandtojudge others may beshaped directly
by social selection. Instead of describing a stable equilibrium,
social selection focuses attention on the dynamic process that
shapes social traits.
Third, human nature is not unitary. Some people are pro-
foundly prosocial, others lack all sympathy. Do individuals
who lack sympathy have a genetic defect? Or, did they miss
some early experience necessary to development of the capac-
ity? Or, is sympathy a facultative trait expressed only in cer-
tain social circumstances? Or is selection for such capacities
so recent that gene frequencies are changing rapidly? Or are
they maintained in some frequency dependent equilibrium?
(Mealey 1995). These are important questions, as yet unan-
swered. While ﬁnding the mean values and distributions for
any trait in any species is valuable, attempts to essentialize hu-
man nature are at odds with both observation of human varia-
tionandanevolutionaryviewofhowhumannaturecametobe.
Forces of social selection may also vary signiﬁcantly be-
tween different groups (Henrich et al. 2005). Even within one
society, different subgroups show different social patterns. It
also seems possible that the beneﬁts of partner choice may
be much larger in some settings compared to others. For in-
stance, if most economic activity requires little cooperation
and no trading, then attending closely to other’s needs will be
of little value as compared to a situation in which competi-
tive presentations of self inﬂuence ﬁtness strongly. High rates
of narcissism may be a reliable product of certain social and
economic structures (Lasch 1979).
A related concern is whether the opportunities for partner
choice have inﬂuenced ﬁtness long enough to create forces of
social selection sufﬁcient to shape complex social traits. To
ﬁnd out this will require anthropological data interpreted in
this framework. The possibility that capacities for profound
sociality arose from culture without inﬂuences from natural
selection seems unlikely. Humans clearly have social capaci-
ties that are qualitatively different from other animals (Kitcher
1993; Dunbar 1998; Tomasello 1999).
Finally, words hide all manner of imprecision that is re-
vealed only by transforming them into mathematical state-
ments.Themathematicalmodelsinthispaperarerudimentary.
Among other factors that need exploration are deception, dif-
ferent parameters for payoffs and noise, and the possibility
that viscosity or other grouping mechanisms may maintain
different equilibria.
No deﬁnitive experiment is likely to prove the role of
social selection in shaping human capacities for cooperation,
and, for the reasons just noted, cross-species comparisons will
not be very useful. Nonetheless, just as a reciprocity models
suggested looking for specialized cheater detection capacities,
social selection models suggest looking for specialized capac-
itiesfordeterminingwhatotherswant,formonitoringwhether
one is pleasing them, and for presenting a social self that will
make one desirable as a social partner. Of course, we already
knowquitealotabouttheoryofmindandtheevolutionofself-
esteem (Leary and Baumeister 2000), so to demonstrate that
they were shaped by social selection will require predicting
unnoticed aspects and looking to see if they are there.
In sum, partner choice can create runaway forces of social
selection that may have shaped human prosocial tendencies
andcapacitiesforadvanced socialcognitionthatareotherwise
difﬁcult to explain. Whether this turns out to be correct awaits
additional modeling, experiments, ﬁeld studies, and further
syntheses with the principles of microeconomics.
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